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Research on self-serving biases in judgments and decision-making suggests that individu-
als ﬁrst evaluate the outcomes they get, and then the procedures bywhich these outcomes
were obtained. Evidence also suggests that the appraisal of the former (outcome favora-
bility) can bias the appraisal of the latter (procedural fairness). We investigated the nature
of the emotions that are elicited by these appraisals by using a new paradigm in which
participants performed a choice task between pairs of competing gambles against a virtual
opponent. Conﬂicts (when the participant selected the same gamble as his virtual oppo-
nent) were resolved by a neutral arbitrator who either conﬁrmed the participant’s choice
(“pro-self”) or attributed his gamble to the virtual opponent (“pro-competitor”). Trials in
which the participant and his virtual opponent selected different gambles (“no-conﬂict”)
served as a control condition. In order to validate this new task, emotional reactions to the
outcomes of the gambles were measured using self-reports, skin conductance responses,
and facial electromyography (zygomaticus, corrugator, and frontalis). In no-conﬂict trials,
effects of counterfactual thinking and social comparison resulted in (i) increased happi-
ness as well as SCR and zygomaticus activity for wins compared to losses (valence effect)
and for high compared to low gains (magnitude effect), and (ii) increased anger, regret,
disappointment, and envy for losses compared to wins (valence effect). More importantly,
compared to no-conﬂict trials and to pro-self awards with similar outcomes, pro-competitor
awards increased subjective reports of anger for unfavorable outcomes, and increased hap-
piness and guilt for favorable outcomes. Although the outcomes were independent from
the arbitrators’ decisions, and both the arbitrators’ decisions and the outcomes were kept
equally likely, individuals tended to attribute their outcomes to unfair arbitrators, reacting
emotionally, especially when the modiﬁcation of their initial choice for a gamble led to a
negative outcome.
Keywords: conflict, arbitration, emotion, appraisals, procedural justice, distributive justice, outcome favorability,
self-serving bias
INTRODUCTION
Emotions are central to decision-making processes, both as an
input and as an output (Han and Lerner, 2009). The decisions
we make have consequences that affect our emotions, and many
choices are guided by an anticipation of these emotions (Mellers,
2000). Numerous parameters, such as the probability and magni-
tude of potential gains and losses are key determinants of one’s
emotional reaction to the outcomes of a decision (Mellers, 1997).
Previous research has indicated that at least four main factors
affect the type and intensity of one’s emotional response to a given
outcome. First, the outcome one gets; Gains elicit happiness and
satisfaction, whereas losses induce sadness and disappointment.
Second, the comparison of the obtained outcome with an alter-
native outcome that could have been obtained under a different
choice (counterfactual comparison); Individuals experience regret
or relief when the outcome they receive is respectively worse or
better than an alternative outcome that could have been obtained
under a different choice (Zeelenberg et al., 1998; Coricelli et al.,
2005; Van Dijk and Zeelenberg, 2005).
Third, the comparison of one’s outcome with a better or worse
outcome received by someone else, like in competitive settings,
elicits envy or, respectively, gloating and schadenfreude (Heider,
1958; Benzeev, 1992; Bault et al., 2008). Individuals learn to antic-
ipate these negative emotions and optimize their decisions to
minimize their likelihood of occurrence (Coricelli and Rustichini,
2010). Effects are generally more pronounced in social compared
to individual context (Bault et al., 2008). Fourth, beyond out-
comes, the procedure by which an outcome is obtained also affects
an individual’s emotions (Loewenstein et al., 1989; Cremer and
Van Hiel, 2006). For instance, individuals do not react in the same
way to outcomes that are generated by humans vs. computers
(Van’tWout et al., 2006), randomly vs. intentionally (Nelissen and
Zeelenberg, 2009), and whether someone can be hold responsible
vs. not (Smith and Ellsworth, 1985).
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An important determinant of one’s reaction to the outcome
of a situation is the appraisal of justice. Perceived injustice is a
primary elicitor of anger and guilt (Mikula et al., 1998; Weiss
et al., 1999; Krehbiel and Cropanzano, 2000). Current theories of
justice (Homans, 1961; Adams, 1965; Walster and Walster, 1975;
Mikula and Wenzel, 2000) postulate that anger and guilt emerge
in the context of disadvantageous and advantageous injustice,
respectively.
An extensive body of research suggests the existence of self-
serving biases in the perception of justice (Walster et al., 1978;
Messick and Sentis, 1979; Thompson and Loewenstein, 1992;
Loewenstein et al., 1993; Babcock et al., 1995). Favorable outcomes
are rated higher on both distributive and procedural fairness, and
people report higher satisfaction with outcomes when they con-
sider that either the outcomes themselves, or the procedure that
arrived at these outcomes, was fair (Skitka et al., 2003).
Studies examining the impact of outcomes and procedures
on speciﬁc emotions also suggest that there may be some inter-
active effects (Brockner and Wiesenfeld, 1996). In two experi-
ments, Cropanzano and colleagues found that outcome favor-
ability affected self-ratings of happiness and disappointment,
whereas anger and guilt were inﬂuenced by speciﬁc combina-
tions of outcome favorability and procedural fairness. When an
objectively unfair procedure was used, unfavorable outcomes
elicited anger, whereas favorable outcome elicited guilt (Weiss
et al., 1999; Krehbiel and Cropanzano, 2000). These emotional
reactions may reﬂect the experience of disadvantageous and
advantageous injustice, respectively. These ﬁndings suggest that
individuals evaluate ﬁrst the favorability of outcomes, and then
the fairness of the process (Copanzano and Folger, 1991; Mon-
tada, 1994; Weiss and Cropanzano, 1996). Moreover, they sug-
gest that the appraisal of the former (distributive justice) not
only interact with, but can also bias, the appraisals of the lat-
ter (procedural justice), in a self-serving manner. Unless they
are provided with persuasive evidence that the process was not
unfair, people are more likely to attribute unfavorable outcomes
to unfair procedures (Francis-Gladney et al., 2010). For the ﬁrst
time, we investigated the emotional correlates of this effect on
self-reported emotions, physiological arousal and facial expressive
behavior.
The present study examined the impact of random arbitration
(the modiﬁcation of a party’s decision using a random rule) on
the emotional reactions to outcomes in a competitive gambling
task. We used a simple choice task between pairs of competing
gambles, similar to previous research (Coricelli et al., 2005; Bault
et al., 2008). In reality, participants were playing against a com-
puter that was programmed to select a different gamble than the
participant in half of the trials (no-conﬂict trials) and the same
gamble in the other half of the trials (conﬂict trials), in random
order. Conﬂicts were resolved by an arbitrator attributing the cho-
sen gamble to one of the players and the non-chosen gamble to the
other player, ostensibly using a 50:50 random rule (like ﬂipping a
coin). Thus, the arbitrator either conﬁrmed the participant’s initial
choice (“pro-self-award”, 50% of the trials) or granted his choice
to his opponent (“pro-competitor-award”, 50% of the trials). The
gambles were then played and revealed the outcomes (50% win,
50% loss).
Our goal was to directly compare how individuals evaluate and
respond to the outcomes of their decisions under three arbitration
contexts: (i) no-conﬂict, (ii) pro-self awards (i.e., trials in which
the arbitrator conﬁrmed the participant’s decision), and (iii) pro-
competitor awards (i.e., trials in which the arbitrator attributed the
participant’s chosen gamble to his/her opponent).
The fact that each arbitrator was not awarding an outcome but
a gamble was important in order to dissociate the effects of out-
comes from the effects of arbitration and study the impact of the
former on the latter. Participants were informed that the arbitra-
tor would do a 50:50 random choice (e.g., ﬂip a coin) to decide
whose choice would prevail. Thus, the arbitration procedure itself
was neither intended to be perceived as fair or unfair, nor was it
intended to be perceived as advantageous or not.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Twenty paid healthy volunteers (14women,mean age 24.2± 5 year
olds) recruited among the student population of the University of
Geneva participated in this experiment in return for payment. The
study was approved by the Geneva Psychology Research Ethical
Committee, and written informed consent was obtained from all
participants. Individuals with symptoms or a history of psychiatric
care, neurological disease, or head injury were not included.
TASK AND PROCEDURE
Subjects sat in a dimly lit sound-attenuated cabin, in front of a
17′′ computer screen placed at a viewing distance of 90 cm. Par-
ticipants performed a computerized two-player gambling task in
competition with a virtual opponent (see Figure 1). In each of
64 trials, a participant and his (virtual) opponent were requested
to choose one of the two competing gambles with the aim of
maximizing their ﬁnancial gains. Participants ﬁrst indicated their
choice before the choice of their opponent was displayed. The
gamble chosen was indicated by a white frame around it. After
a variable delay (1000–2500ms), the opponent’s choice was indi-
cated by a black frame around the selected gamble. If the gambles
chosen by the two players were different (no-conﬂict trials), the
gambles were played and the outcomes were displayed. Trials in
which the two players had chosen the same gamble were labeled
conﬂict trials. Participants were told that in the event of a conﬂict
between the two choices, an arbitrator (represented by a neutral
face appearing in the foregroundof the gambles)would either con-
ﬁrm the participant’s choice and attribute the non-selected gamble
to the opponent (pro-self arbitration), or conﬁrm the opponent’s
choice and attribute the non-selected gamble to the participant
(pro-opponent arbitration). As in no-conﬂict trials, the gambles
were then played and the outcomes displayed. After each trial,
participants were requested to report the intensity of subjectively
experienced emotions using a series of 7-points Likert-type scales.
The following emotional labels were used, in random order: anger,
happiness/satisfaction, sadness/disappointment, regret, guilt, and
envy. In addition to self-reports, we measured physiological
arousal using skin conductance recordings, and expressive behav-
ior using facial electromyography (EMG).
We used four different gambles that differed in terms of
probabilities of winning (20, 40, 60, and 80%) and magnitude
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FIGURE 1 | Description of the task: trial events for the three different arbitration conditions (no-conflict, pro-self awards, and pro-competitor awards).
of potential gain (120, 60, 40, and 30 points) but the product of
both was constant, i.e., equal expected value. For each pair of gam-
bles, the probabilities of winning added up to 100% to ensure that
there was a winner and a loser in each trial. In 32 trials, one of the
gambles offered a 20% chance of winning 120 points and the other
offered an 80% chance of winning 30 points. In another 32 trials,
one of the gambles offered a 40% chance of winning 60 points
and the other offered a 60% chance of winning 40 points. There-
after, these trials are referred to as risky and safe trials respectively,
because the variance between potential outcomes is respectively
high and low (Figure 2). In reality, all the gambles played were
programmed to provide an equal number of wins and losses1.
This procedure was important to avoid frequency confounds, as
1In case of loss, the participant won nothing, whereas his or her opponent won the
amount of his gamble. Although the outcome is a no-gain, we call it a loss trial
considering both the competitive context and the social comparison of one’s own
outcome with the opponent’s outcome.
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FIGURE 2 | Effects of arbitration on self-reported emotions as a
function of outcome. Interactive effects of outcomes and arbitration.
(A–C) Pro-competitor arbitration increases anger for high-loss (0–120),
reduces guilt for low-loss (0–30), reduces happiness for low-gain (30–0), and
increases guilt for high-win (120–0).
infrequent events trigger emotional reactions (Aue et al., 2007;
Delplanque et al., 2009). It is noteworthy, however, that the post
experiment questionnaire indicated that none of the participants
had realized this. Because we could not predict our participants’
decisions, the use of a virtual player allowed us to manipulate
the opponent’s choices in an interactive way, i.e., with respect to
each participant’s actual decisions. The task was programmed to
ensure an equal number of trials in each condition (i.e., conﬂict
vs. no-conﬂict, pro-self vs. pro-competitor awards, and wins vs.
losses). More precisely, the virtual player’s choices were contingent
upon theparticipant’s choices (50%same choice and50%different
choice). Similarly, the arbitrator assigned an equal number of pro-
self and pro-other awards (50% pro-self and 50% pro-competitor
awards). Again, this prevented us from any frequency confounds
in our interpretation of emotional effects. Thus, whatever the par-
ticipant’s decisions, there were 32 conﬂict trials and 32 no-conﬂict
trials. Among the no-conﬂict trials (control condition) the par-
ticipant won 16 times and lost 16 times, regardless of the gamble
he or she had selected. Among the conﬂict trials, there were 16
trials in which the participant’s decision was maintained (pro-self
awards, 8 winning and 8 losing trials) and 16 trials in which the
participant’s decision was changed (pro-competitor awards, 8 win-
ning and 8 losing trials). The order of trials and conditions was
fully randomized within and across subjects in order to reduce
participants’ ability to detect our experimental manipulations.
To increase participants’ motivation and involvement in the
task and thereby their emotional reactions, the points gained dur-
ing the task were cumulated across trials and paid in cash after
the experiment (100 points= 1 CHF). To increase competition,
we told our participants that they would receive a bonus, but that
this bonus would only be granted if they scored higher than their
opponent, whereas they would receive only a base participation
fee if they scored below their opponent.
PHYSIOLOGICAL RECORDINGS AND PROCESSING
Participants were instructed to keep their non-dominant forearm
resting on the table throughout the duration of the experiment.
Once a participant had signed his consent and completed the per-
sonality questionnaires, physiological sensors were attached. After
that, participants were asked to ﬁnd a comfortable sitting position
and reminded to avoid any unnecessary movements and speech
during the procedure. Moreover, they were instructed to stay alert,
to keep their eyes open, and to breathe normally. Participants
were provided with a computer mouse and the instructions for
the experimental task. Physiological signals were assessed using
TEL 100 Remote Monitoring System of Biopac Systems (Santa
Barbara, CA, USA) with separate settings for electromyographic
and electrodermal activities. Signals were transferred from the
experimental room to the MP100 Acquisition Unit (16 bit A/D
conversion) in an adjacent room and stored on computer hard
disk (sampling rate 1000Hz).
Physiological arousal: skin conductance responses
To examine whether arbitration decisions affected physiological
arousal in our experimental paradigm, we recorded electrodermal
activity continuously during the task and analyzed skin con-
ductance responses ofﬂine. Electrodermal activity was recorded
(high-pass ﬁlter: 0.025Hz) by the constant voltagemethod (0.5V).
Beckman Ag–AgCl electrodes (8-mm diameter active area) ﬁlled
with a skin conductance paste (Biopac) were attached to the palm
side of the middle phalanges of the second and third ﬁngers of
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the participants’ non-dominant hand. Speciﬁc skin conductance
responses (SCRs) to outcomes were measured in microSiemens
(μS) and analyzed ofﬂine. They were scored as changes in conduc-
tance (greater than 0.02μS) starting in the 1000–4000-ms interval
after the onset of the stimulus (Dawson et al., 1990). SCRs were
square root transformed to normalize the data (Edelberg, 1972).
Emotion expression: facial electromyography
To determine whether arbitration decisions affected emotion
expression in our experimental paradigm, surface EMG activ-
ity of facial muscles was additionally recorded. As an index of
facial expression, activity of the Corrugator Supercilii, Zygomati-
cus Major, and Frontalis muscles was measured on the left side
of the face at a sampling rate of 1000Hz. Prior to application
of the electrodes, the designated sites on the skin surface were
cleanedwith distilledwater and cottonpads and abradedusingﬁne
emery paper. EMG recordings were obtained with 4-mm minia-
ture Beckman Ag/AgCl electrode pairs ﬁlled with conductance gel
(Biopac). In a bipolar conﬁguration, electrodes were placed above
the left eyebrow for assessment of Corrugator Supercilii muscle
activity, on the left cheek in the middle of the mouth-to-ear tip
line for Zygomaticus Major activity and above the eye brows for
Frontalis activity. Sensor placement followed recommendations
by Fridlund and Cacioppo (1986). Interelectrode distance (cen-
ter to center) was 1 cm for each recording site. While the sensors
were applied, participants were instructed to completely relax their
face. Electrodes resistance was kept below 10 KO. EMG amplitude
during the 500-ms before outcome presentation served as base-
line. To allow us to examine the facial EMG response within 10 s
after the presentation of the outcome, we expressed mean EMG
amplitudes during subsequent 100-ms time intervals as a per-
centage of the mean amplitude of the baseline. Percentage scores
were introduced to standardize the widely differing absolute EMG
amplitudes of individual participants and thus enable comparison
between individuals and groups (De Wied et al., 2006). Activity
was then quantiﬁed as average of EMG amplitude within the 10-s2
following the presentation of the outcome.
STATISTICAL ANALYSES
Analyses were conﬁned to the 32 risky trials in which the variance
betweenpossible outcomeswashigh (Figure 2). Becausemost sub-
jects (18/20) chose the more uncertain gamble of each pair (i.e.,
lower probability but higher amount) in more than half of the
trials, there was a substantial amount of missing data (14%) that
was not randomly distributed. Effects of outcomes and arbitration
were analyzed separately using Friedman repeated-measure analy-
ses of variance by rank, followed by pairwiseWilcoxon signed-rank
tests in case of statistically signiﬁcant effects3. There are four
possible outcomes depending on the participant’s and his oppo-
nent’s gains (high-loss: 0–120, low-loss: 0–30, low-win: 30–0, and
2We chose a−500 to 10,000-ms time window to include the whole contraction until
the return to baseline. Analyses with a −500 to 3,000-ms showed similar results.
3We performed additional repeated-measures ANOVAs on our data after trans-
formation to ﬁll missing values with linear trend interpolation and with mean
substitution in order to test for the interactive effects of outcomes and arbitra-
tion. These analyses conﬁrmed our results and are kept available to the reviewers if
required.
high-win: 120–0), and three arbitration conditions (no-conﬂict,
pro-self decision, pro-competitor decision).
Before testing the effect of arbitration, it was important to show
that our new paradigm indeed elicited emotional reactions in our
participants. Therefore, we ﬁrst examined whether the outcomes
of gambles chosen by participants elicited the predicted pattern of
emotional reactions, in the absence of arbitration. These analyses
therefore focused on the no-conﬂict trials.
Effect of outcomes on self-reports
Because in social settings, and contrary to private ones, gains loom
larger than losses (Bault et al., 2008),we predicted that participants
would report greater levels of happiness for winning trials com-
pared to losing trials (valence effect) and for high gains compared
to low gains (magnitude effect). In contrast, we expected greater
disappointment and regret for losses compared to wins (Coricelli
et al., 2005). On loss trials, we expected that the magnitude of the
other’s gain would affect self-ratings of envy (Bault et al., 2008;
Takahashi et al., 2009; Coricelli and Rustichini, 2010).
Effect of arbitration on self-reports
We hypothesized that the same outcome would be appraised dif-
ferently and hence would lead to differential emotional responses
under the various arbitration conditions.We predicted that partic-
ipants’ ratings of anger and guilt would reﬂect the interactive effect
of outcome favorability andprocedural injustice (Weiss et al., 1999;
Krehbiel and Cropanzano, 2000). More speciﬁcally, outcomes of
gambles obtained after a modiﬁcation of one’s initial choice (to
which one may feel entitled) are more likely to be perceived as
unfair and attributed to an external factor (e.g., the arbitrator).
Therefore, we expected participants to report increased levels of
anger after pro-competitor awards that resulted in a loss compared
to no-conﬂict and pro-self awards that led to the same outcomes
(i.e., disadvantageous arbitration for the participant but advanta-
geous for his opponent). On the other hand,we expected increased
guilt after pro-self awards that resulted in a gain in comparison to
no-conﬂict and pro-competitor awards (i.e., advantageous arbi-
tration for the participant but disadvantageous for his opponent).
Due to self-serving biases in attribution (Francis-Gladney et al.,
2010), we expected stronger effects of arbitration on losses (anger)
compared to wins (guilt).
Effects of outcomes and arbitration on SCR and EMG
In addition to self-reported subjective emotions, we also expected
an effect of outcomes and arbitration decisions on physiolog-
ical arousal and facial expressive behavior. In the component
process model (CPM) of emotion (Scherer et al., 2001; Sander
et al., 2005), event appraisals, motivational shifts, physiological
responses, motor expression, and subjective feelings are treated as
dynamically interrelated and integrated components. Skin con-
ductance is used as an index of emotional arousal which is gen-
erally correlated with emotional intensity (Sequeira et al., 2009).
Facial muscles activity can provide additional information about
the type of emotion experienced and eventually expressed. In
particular, some emotional facial expressions have been associ-
ated with speciﬁc patterns of activity (Ekman and Friesen, 1978):
the muscles responsible for smiling (zygomaticus major, e.g.,
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happiness) being distinct from those responsible for frowning
(corrugator supercilii, e.g., anger), and from those responsible for
eyebrow rise (frontalis, e.g., surprise). Moreover, previous work
shows that differential activity in these muscles is also sensitive
to differences in appraisals, especially regarding novelty, valence
(pleasantness), goal conduciveness, and fairness (Aue et al., 2007;
Chapman et al., 2009; Delplanque et al., 2009).
We expected effects of outcomes and arbitration on physi-
ological responses and facial expressions, mirroring self-reports
(i.e., increased zygomaticus activity and SCR for gains compared
to losses (Bault et al., 2008) and increased corrugator activity
for losses obtained after pro-competitor arbitration compared to
no-conﬂict trials).
RESULTS
EFFECTS OF OUTCOMES (NO-CONFLICT TRIALS)
Statistical effects of outcomes on emotions are summarized in
Table 1.
Subjective self-reports
Analyses of the no-conﬂict trials showed a signiﬁcant effect of
outcome on all subjective assessments of emotions (N = 13,
all χ2> 35, ps< 0.001), except for guilt, which only showed
a marginal effect (N = 13, χ2 = 14.03, p< 0.060). Participants
reported increased anger, increased regret, and increased disap-
pointment after low-losses compared to low-wins (all ps< 0.01)
and after high-losses compared to high-wins (all ps< 0.01), but
there was no signiﬁcant difference between low-wins and high-
wins or between low-losses and high-losses. Participants also
reported increased happiness after low-wins compared to low-
losses (Z = 3.17, p< 0.01), after high-wins compared to high-
losses (Z = 3.35, p< 0.001), and after high-wins compared to
low-wins (Z = 3.11,p< 0.01),but therewas no difference between
low-losses and high-losses.We also found increased guilt after low-
losses compared to low-wins (Z = 2.67,p< 0.01), and greater envy
after low-losses compared to low-wins (Z = 2.9, p< 0.01), and
after high-losses compared to high-wins (Z = 2.57, p< 0.05).
Emotion expression (facial EMG) and physiological arousal (SCR)
Outcomes had a signiﬁcant effect on the activity of the zygo-
maticus (N = 12, χ2 = 21.64, p< 0.05), which was signiﬁcantly
increased in high-wins compared to high-loss conditions
(Z = 2.41, p< 0.05). There was no signiﬁcant effect of outcomes
on the activity of the corrugator and frontalis. Outcomes also
had a signiﬁcant effect on SCR (N = 12, χ2 = 27.31, p< 0.001),
which was signiﬁcantly increased after high-wins compared to
high-losses (Z = 3.18, p< 0.001) and after high-wins compared
to low-wins (Z = 3.18, p< 0.001).
In sum, results show an effect of outcome valence on self-
reported emotions, SCR, and zygomaticus activity. Additional
effects of outcome magnitude were observed on self-reports of
happiness and SCR.
EFFECTS OF ARBITRATION
Figure 2 shows participants’ subjective emotional reactions to
outcomes as a function of arbitration.
Subjective self-reports
Arbitration had a signiﬁcant effect on self-reported anger for
high-loss outcomes (0–120: N = 9, χ2 = 9.31, p< 0.05). Partic-
ipants reported more anger following pro-competitor awards
compared to pro-self awards and no-conﬂict, but there was no
difference between pro-self awards and no-conﬂict trials (Pro-
comp vs. No: Z = 3.11, p< 0.05; Procomp vs. Pro-self: Z = 2.20,
p< 0.05; Pro-self vs. No: Z = 1.070, NS).
Arbitration signiﬁcantly affected self-reports of guilt for low-
loss and high-win outcomes (0–30: N = 11, χ2 = 7.091, p< 0.05;
120–0: N = 10, χ2 = 6.615, p< 0.05). For low-losses (0–30), guilt
was higher following pro-competitor awards compared to pro-self
and to no-conﬂict, but there was no difference between pro-self
and no-conﬂict (Procomp vs. Pro-self: Z = 2.58, p< 0.05; Pro-
comp vs. No: Z = 2.58 p< 0.05; Pro-self vs. No: Z = 1.57, NS).
For high-wins (120–0), guilt was higher after pro-competitor
compared to no-conﬂict trials (Z = 1.88, p< 0.05).
Arbitration signiﬁcantly affected self-reports of happiness for
low-win outcomes (N = 10, χ2 = 12.60, p< 0.05) and there was
a marginal effect for high-win outcomes (N = 10, χ2 = 4.974,
p< 0.09). For low-wins, happiness was lower after pro-competitor
awards compared to no-conﬂict trials (Procomp vs. No: Z = 2.50,
p< 0.05; Procomp vs. Pro-self: Z = 1.69, NS; Pro-self vs. No:
Z = 0.66, NS), whereas for high-wins, happiness was higher after
pro-competitor awards compared to no-conﬂict trials (Procomp
vs. No: Z =−2.497, p< 0.05; Procomp vs. Pro-self: Z = 1.60, NS;
Procomp vs. No: Z =−0.34, NS).
Table 1 | Summary of statistical results for the effect of outcomes in the no-conflict situation.
Self-reports Physiology
Ang. Dis. Hap. Reg. Env. Guilt Zygo.* Corru. Front. S.C.R.*
Valence High-loss (0–120) vs. High-win (120–0) → → → → → → → →
Low-loss (0–30) vs. Low-win (30–0) → → → → → →
Magnitude High-loss (0–120) vs. Low-loss (0–30)
High-win (120–0) vs. Low-win (30–0) → →
Ang. Dis. Hap. Reg. Env. Zygo. Corru. Front. S.C.R. refer respectively to Anger, Disappointment, Happiness, Regret, Envy, Zygomaticus, Corrugator, Frontalis, Skin
Conductance Response. → means that there is an increase (e.g., anger high-loss> anger high-win), → means that there is a decrease (e.g., SCR high-loss<SCR
high-win).
*Note that for zygomaticus activity and SCR, the effects are better understood as increased response for wins compared to losses rather than reduced responses
for losses compared to wins.
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Arbitration did not affect self-reports of disappointment or
regret. Friedman analyses revealed a signiﬁcant effect of arbitral
awards on envy in low-win outcomes (30–0: N = 10, χ2 = 7.40,
p< 0.05). However, post hoc Wilcoxon tests did not show any sig-
niﬁcant difference between the three arbitration situations (all
ps> 0.19).
Expressive behavior (facial EMG) and physiological arousal (SCR)
For technical reasons, data from two subjects could not be
recorded. Hence, the analyses were performed on 18 subjects
instead of 20. Friedman analyses showed an effect of arbitral
awards on the activity of the frontalis for low-win outcomes (30–0:
N = 9, χ2 = 6.22 p< 0.05). However, post hoc Wilcoxon analyses
failed to ﬁnd any signiﬁcant difference between the three arbi-
tration situations (all ps> 0.17). No signiﬁcant effect of arbitral
awards on SCR was observed in the Friedman analyses.
In sum, results show an effect of random arbitration on self-
reports of anger, happiness, and guilt, depending on the ﬁnal
gambling outcome. Importantly, these effects were observed only
when the participant’s initial choice was affected by the arbitrator’s
decision.
DISCUSSION
This study investigated the consequences of random arbitration
(using a 50:50 rule, such as ﬂipping a coin) on the emotional
reactions to outcomes of gambles in a competitive task.
EMOTIONAL EFFECTS OF OUTCOMES (NO-CONFLICT TRIALS)
In no-conﬂict trials, the outcomes of the gambles elicited the
predicted pattern of emotional responses. Participants reported
greater happiness on wins compared to losses (valence effect)
and they reported increasing levels of happiness with increasing
amount of gains (magnitude effect). In contrast, they reported
more anger, regret, and disappointment with losses compared to
wins (valence effect). Participants also reported more envy after
a loss than after a win. These results can be considered as evi-
dence for the validity of our task because they suggest that the
emotions induced by our task are consistent with the current lit-
erature (Mellers, 1997; Zeelenberg et al., 2000; Bault et al., 2008).
The fact that both electrodermal activity and zygomaticus activ-
ity also increased with increasing gains extends these ﬁndings to
physiological measures of emotion and suggests that our partic-
ipants actually experienced the reported emotions and that their
subjective ratings do not only reﬂect social desirability effects.
Our results question the speciﬁcity of the effects that have been
attributed to regret and envy in some previous studies (e.g., Cori-
celli et al., 2007; Bault et al., 2008). In these studies, emotions
were measured using a single continuous scale labeled from very
negative to very positive. Emotions were then categorized accord-
ing to the experimental conditions: When the outcome of the
non-chosen gamble was not revealed, the ratings were labeled
“disappointment”; When the obtained outcome was worse than
the outcome of the alternative, unchosen gamble, the ratings were
labeled “regret”, because this emotion is thought to reﬂect coun-
terfactual comparison; Finally, when the outcome of the unchosen
gamblewasobtainedby another individual the ratingswere labeled
“envy” because it is thought to arise from social comparison.
In the present study, we used different scales for each emotion
but failed to ﬁnd any differential effect of outcomes on regret,
disappointment, and anger, as well as on happiness and envy.
EMOTIONAL EFFECTS OF RANDOM ARBITRATION: PROCEDURAL
JUSTICE
Consistent with an impact of arbitration on appraisals of injus-
tice (Weiss and Cropanzano, 1996), we found increased anger and
guilt followingdisadvantageous andadvantageouspro-competitor
awards respectively. However, random arbitration (the ﬂipping of
a coin), by deﬁnition, should not be perceived as procedurally
unfair. The critical ﬁnding here is that arbitration affected subjec-
tive emotional feelings only when the participant’s own choice
was awarded to his opponent (pro-competitor) and not when
the opponent’s choice was awarded to the participant (pro-self),
although the outcomewas the same. This suggests that agency (i.e.,
being the target of another’s actions) may play a key role in one’s
response to arbitration decisions. Subjects may have developed a
sense of ownership and feel entitled to the gamble they originally
chose. As a consequence, they may have overvalued it as compared
to the gamble they did not choose (a phenomenon known as the
“endowment effect”, e.g., Kahneman et al., 1990) and they may
have felt that they had been treated unjustly when dispossessed of
their preferred choice by the arbitrator.
IMPACT OF OUTCOME FAVORABILITY ON PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS
Our study replicates and extends the existing literature on distrib-
utive and procedural justice, and their interaction (Brockner and
Wiesenfeld, 1996; Skitka et al., 2003). Studies examining the inter-
active effects of outcomes and procedures on emotions show that
people experience anger when they receive unfavorable outcomes
from disadvantageously unfair procedures, whereas they experi-
ence guilt when they obtain favorable outcomes from advanta-
geously unfair procedures (Weiss et al., 1999;Krehbiel andCropan-
zano, 2000). The fact that we observed similar effects suggests that
even a random procedure can, under certain circumstances, be
perceived as unfair and elicit similar emotions. When their choice
had been altered by the arbitrator, participants felt dispossessed,
and subsequently reappraised the process as being biased, which
resulted in increased levels of anger when the outcome turned out
to be unfavorable, and increased happiness and guilt when the
outcome turned out to be favorable. In addition, research on self-
serving biases in attribution (Francis-Gladney et al., 2010) suggests
that biases in attributions of causality, responsibility, and maybe
intentionality may have led our participants to (re)appraise ran-
dom arbitration as being biased and unfair, especially in the case of
unfavorable outcomes. Overall, this pattern of result is consistent
with the literature on egocentric biases in the perception of jus-
tice, and with the idea that the appraisals of outcome favorability
can bias the appraisals of procedural fairness in such a way that
it affects one’s emotions (Weiss et al., 1999; Krehbiel and Cropan-
zano, 2000). However, given that we did not measure subjects’
perception of fairness, we should emphasize the possibility for
alternative interpretations, which may not involve (in)justice. For
example, participants may experience and report anger because
they feel dispossessed of their preferred choice, without perceiving
this as being unfair.
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JUSTICE AND EMOTIONS
The present results are consistent with appraisal theories of emo-
tions, which postulate that emotions arise from the evaluation of
a situation with regards to an individual’s concerns (Frijda, 1986;
Scherer et al., 2001). Each situation is appraised on a number of
criteria, and the output of these appraisals is multidimensional,
affecting not only the subjective experience of emotion but also
physiological arousal and emotion expression, as well as action
tendencies. In our study, the outcomes and the arbitration process
may have been appraised on several dimensions, such as valence,
goal conduciveness, causality (e.g., agency and intentionality), and
normative signiﬁcance (e.g., compatibility with internal standards
and external norms). These dimensions are particularly important
for the elicitation and differentiation of emotion, and research has
already conﬁrmed the importance of injustice appraisals in the
experience of anger and guilt (Mikula et al., 1998), as well as in
the experience and facial expression of disgust (Chapman et al.,
2009). It should be noted, however, that injustice is not the only
cause of anger and guilt. People tend to get angrywhen they cannot
reach their goals, and they feel guilty when they are hold respon-
sible for having harmed someone. It is unlikely, though, that these
processes occurred in the present task, and therefore we doubt that
these could account for the present ﬁndings.
Appraisal theories also discuss the consequences of emotions
for individual and social behavior (Davidson et al., 2003). At
the intrapersonal level, emotions modulate perception, attention,
memory as well as more complex functions, such as ﬂexibility,
creativity, problem-solving, and decision-making (Dolan, 2002).
At the interpersonal level, emotions play a fundamental role in
communicating one’s feelings (Ekman, 1993), action tendencies
(Frijda and Tcherkassof, 1997) and orientation toward others
(Knutson,1996). This is particularly important as this information
may in turn be used as incentives or deterrents for others’ indi-
vidual or social behavior (Cacioppo and Gardner, 1999). Indeed,
previous research shows that positive emotions increase proso-
cial behavior, including intentions to trust and cooperate (Fehr
and Fischbacher, 2004), whereas negative emotions by contrast
contribute to antisocial, competitive, and aggressive behaviors. In
addition,both intra- and inter-personal effectsmayhave an impact
on the perception of self and of the other, and thereby on the emer-
gence, course, and management of conﬂict. Anger, for example,
is probably the most prominent and pervasive emotion to arise
in conﬂict (Allred, 1999). Humans tend to get angry when they
encounter an obstruction to a goal (like possessing a scarce good),
especially when they feel entitled to possession (or treated unjustly
when dispossessed), and when they feel sufﬁciently powerful (by
themselves or with the help of others) to assert their rights and
reach their goal, if necessary with the help of violence. Because
both parties in a conﬂict may show a similar selﬁsh bias and there-
fore react in this manner, the consequence is often an escalation of
anger and threats, in many cases leading to actual violence or war.
CONCLUSION
To conclude, the present study provided two major ﬁndings.
First, we showed that the effect of outcome favorability on par-
ticipants’ emotions depends on both the valence (winning or
losing the trial) and the magnitude (low or high amount) of
the outcome. Winning increases positive emotions and decreases
negative emotions compared to losing, and vice versa, but there
was no signiﬁcant difference between disappointment, regret, and
envy. Further research should addressmore directlywhether coun-
terfactual thinking and social comparison affect these emotions
differentially, as some previous studies suggest. Second,we showed
that biases in the appraisal of outcome favorability can inﬂuence
the appraisal of procedural fairness in an egocentric way.Although
the outcomes were determined by gambles and were thus inde-
pendent from the arbitration process, we found that arbitration
using a neutral, objective, and impartial rule (a computer pro-
grammed to give equal numbers of pro-self and pro-competitor
decisions to all participants) affected self-reports of anger, and to
a lesser extent guilt, when the outcome of the received gamble was
unfavorable and favorable, respectively. Importantly, these effects
were observed for pro-competitor awards only, and despite the
explanation that the arbitrator would decide randomly in each
case, using a 50:50 coin ﬂip, who would keep the selected gamble.
Moreover, the gambles were also programmed to ensure an equal
number of wins and losses after each arbitration decision. These
results are consistent with the literature on self-serving biases in
the perception of justice, and may be explained by the impact
of outcome favorability on procedural justice. Critical factors are
(a) whether one is personally affected by the process (e.g., self-
serving biases in attribution, which may be activated by the felt
dispossession), and (b) whether the received outcome is favorable
or not (e.g., self-serving biases in appraisals of outcome favor-
ability). Future research should clarify the role of expectations
and attributions (e.g., causality, intentionality, responsibility) in
appraisals of distributive and procedural justice, and their impact
on emotions and self-serving biases in third-party conﬂict reso-
lution. More signiﬁcantly, compared to no-conﬂict trials and to
pro-self awards with similar outcomes, pro-competitor decisions
by a neutral arbitrator resulted in increased subjective reports of
anger for unfavorable outcomes, and increased happiness and guilt
for favorable outcomes. Despite the use of a neutral computer,
which was programmed to ensure outcome equality, but was pre-
sented as being an arbitrator ﬂipping a coin in each case with even
odds, individuals emotional reactions may reﬂect their tendency
to perceive a loss as being due to a bias in the arbitrator’s decision,
and to attribute their unsuccessful outcomes to an unfair arbitra-
tor, rather than to an unfortunate gamble. This suggests that itmay
be impossible for arbitrators to ever be perceived as being neutral,
objective, and independent, all themore so when they are not con-
strained to a random outcome generation process (e.g., ﬂipping
a coin), but when having to apply a legal syllogism whereby the
facts and the law determine an outcome. Further research on this
is important, as well as assessing emotional perceptions of bias in
other forms of dispute resolution compared to arbitration (e.g.,
mediation or conciliation).
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